

ergo

Jelen könyv elsődlegesen nem filozófiatörténeti szakmunka, hanem elméleti igényű vállalkozás, amely a filozófiatörténet mint elméleti filozófiai probléma célbavételére tesz kísérletet a kontinentális filozófiai tradíciók belül. A filozófiatörténetnek a kortárs magyar filozófia módszertani vitáiban betöltött szerepéből kiindulva, a filozófiatörténet-felfogások történetére (a filozófiatörténet elmélettörténetére) vonatkozó vizsgálódások révén fokozatosan felfejti azt az egészen a 19. század derekának poszthegeliánus filozófiájáig visszavezethető helyzetet, amelyben a filozófiatörténet értelmére irányuló filozófiai kérdés találja magát a kontinentális, közelebbről a fenomenológiai filozófia tradícióján belül. Ezt követően a filozófiatörténet problémájának közvetlen elméleti célbavételét kísérli meg, amelyhez az első rész elmélettörténeti vizsgálódásain túlmenően a második világháború utáni német filozófia egyik legjelentősebb alakzatát alkotó Ritter-iskola középszárnyának gondolkodóit, valamint a korai fenomenológia (Franz Brentano, a Brentano-iskola és Edmund Husserl) inautenticitás-koncepcióit hívja segítségül. A könyv vizsgálódásainak eredményeképpen a filozófiatörténet a filozófia egy termékeny regionális problémájaként – mondhatni a filozófiai problémakincs legnehezebben elidegeníthető darabjaként – mutatkozik meg, strukturális analógiát szolgáltatva más intellektuális tradíciók történetek (tudomány, vallás) filozófiai megragadásához, amint a filozófiatörténetre vonatkozó reflexiók története maga is számos meglepő ponton fonódott össze vallástörténeti megfontolásokkal.

Varga Péter András filozófus, filozófiatörténész, a Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont (BTK) Filozófiai Intézetének munkatársa. Kutatási területei a 19–20. századi német nyelvű filozófia – különösen a korai fenomenológia – és a korabeli magyar filozófia története, valamint a fenomenológia és a filozófiatörténet-írás módszertani kérdései. Két korábbi monográfia szerzője és több kötet társszerkesztője, tanulmányai többek között a *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology*, a *Husserl Studies*, a *Brentano Studien*, a *Phänomenologische Forschungen* és a *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle* lapjain jelentek meg.

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Gondolat  
Kiadó



BTK  
Filozófiai Intézet

## A FILOZÓFIATÖRTÉNET FILOZÓFIÁJA A KORTÁRS KONTINENTÁLIS FILOZÓFIÁBAN

VARGA PÉTER ANDRÁS

# Mi a filozófia- történet?

ergo

VARGA PÉTER ANDRÁS • Mi a filozófiatörténet?





VARGA PÉTER ANDRÁS

# Mi a filozófia- történet?

A filozófiatörténet filozófiája  
a kortárs kontinentális filozófiában

Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont,  
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Minden jog fenntartva. Bármilyen másolás, sokszorosítás, illetve adatfeldolgozó rendszerben való tárolás a kiadó előzetes írásbeli hozzájárulásához van kötve.

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## Detailed Summary in English

### WHAT IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY? THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY

What the present book aims at is not merely a scholarly monograph on the history of philosophy, but rather it intends to undertake a philosophical endeavor dedicated to the theoretical problem posed by the history of philosophy as such within the framework of the so-called Continental branch of contemporary philosophy. In order to secure the grounds for formulating the philosophical question pertaining to the problem of the history of philosophy, *Chapter One (Approaches to the Philosophical Problem of the History of Philosophy)* introduces a set of preliminary demarcations vis-à-vis mainstream views of the history of philosophy: (1) The philosophical problem of the history of philosophy is not (necessarily) a subordinate problem within the philosophy of history; (2) The philosophy of the history of philosophy is not (exclusively) determined by hermeneutical reflections upon the conditions of the possibility of understanding historical texts in general; (3) the supposed primacy of historicity or temporality within fundamental ontology or theory of constitution does not provide a (detailed contentual) answer to the question pertaining to the history of philosophy; (4) this question is (obviously) not aimed at designating a particular past or present formation as the fulfilment of the history of philosophy; (5) finally, what the necessary historicization of this question implies is far from being a chronologically organized presentation of the views on the nature of the history of philosophy held by particular historical philosophers. Quite the contrary, the reason why the first part of the book engages itself in investigations of historical theories of the history of philosophy (i.e., the theory-history of the history of philosophy [*Theoriegeschichte der Philosophiegeschichte*]) is solely to render our philosophical questioning possible by virtue of explicating – in a gradual and zig-zag fashion (so-to-speak through a historicized hermeneutics) – the situation from which this questioning should emerge, as well as the tacit presuppositions inherent in it.



Consequently, the remaining part of *Chapter One* intends to implement one facet of this strategy by interrogating the situation specific to contemporary Hungarian philosophers with regard to the problem of the history of philosophy. This situation, rooted in the process of de-ideologization of Hungarian philosophy in the 1980s which led to the prevalence of works dedicated to the history of philosophy (what semi-contemporaneous observers termed »the historical turn« of Hungarian philosophy), is defined by repercussions of four major methodological debates in contemporary Hungarian philosophy that are analyzed in this chapter. (1) In the wake of methodological reflections surrounding the political transformations of 1989–1990, both István M. Fehér, a historian of modern philosophy, and his colleague László Tengelyi (1954–2014), who had been explicitly aiming at a creative further development of Continental philosophy, strongly argued against any methodological separation between doing philosophy and writing its history. (2) In the early 1990s, however, a fascinating, dense and explicit methodological debate took place between Tengelyi and Balázs M. Mezei, also working in contemporary Continental philosophy, over the philosophical relevance of the history of philosophy, articulated in terms of the architectonics of transcendental phenomenology and its relationship to philosophical hermeneutics. (3) When the infamous hostilities between so-called Analytic and Continental philosophers arrived to Hungary, spurring a surprisingly intense explicit Analytic vs. Continental Debate in Hungary in the second half of the first decade of the new century, the contributions by the novel protagonists of this debate, esp. the Analytic philosopher János Tózsér and his Continental counterpart Tamás Ullmann, already manifested the long-lasting implicit consequences of the Tengelyi-Mezei debate, insofar as the history of philosophy was regarded as inherently devoid of direct philosophical relevance, while implicit philosophical ideas concerning history of philosophy (e.g. the notion of *philosophia perennis* or historically instituted philosophical presuppositions) subliminally underpinned the debate. (4) The recent methodological book by Tózsér (*Moments of Truth. An Essay on the Failure of Philosophical Knowledge* [in Hungarian; an English edition is reportedly underway]) has not only galvanized the Hungarian professional philosophers, but it is also reverberating through wider circles of the Hungarian culture and general audience, in a way that has been unprecedented for decades. The present chapter undertakes

a detailed analysis of Tózsér's position in order to demonstrate its proximity to a transcendental metaphilosophy in disguise, as well as a *Bildungsroman* of Tózsér's intellectual journey within the Hungarian professional philosophical community. Tózsér's work, thus, *nolens-volens* reveals the philosophical relevance of the history of philosophy and simultaneously its complex material dimension as well.

*Chapter Two (Historical Overture: Bernhard Alexander's Peregrination and the History of Philosophy)* could be regarded as a transition between historical investigations directed at semi-contemporary Hungarian philosophy versus late-nineteenth century German-speaking philosophy, insofar as this chapter is dedicated to the peregrination (i.e., period of university studies abroad) of the young Bernhard Alexander (1850–1927), who, before becoming a towering Neo-Kantian figure of late nineteenth century philosophy in Hungary, attended the universities of Vienna (WS 1868/79 – SS 1871), Berlin (WS 1871/72), Göttingen (SS 1872), and Leipzig (WS 1872/72 – SS 1873), where he obtained his doctoral degree in 1873. Based on archival research conducted on the circumstances of Alexander's peregrination by the present author, as well as analysis of Alexander's writings on the theory of the history of philosophy (including Alexander's Hungarian habilitation thesis, entitled *The Idea of the History of Philosophy, in View of the History in General*), this chapter attempts to reconstruct Alexander's position that not only embodies a rare example of dedicated theoretical reflections on the nature of the history of philosophy by a Hungarian philosopher, but, by virtue of the young and penniless Alexander's odyssey through Austrian and German universities of the early 1870s, it could also provide a welcomed occasion to glimpse into a remote and nearly inaccessible philosophical context, namely the German-speaking academic philosophy (*Universitätsphilosophie*) of the early 1870s, which was overshadowed by the advent of institutionalized Neo-Kantianism in the subsequent years. It is only in the course of the historical chapters of the present book that the true extent to which Alexander's own philosophy of the history of philosophy *in nuce* contains its German counterparts becomes visible and could provide us with a guideline for our historical investigations.

In order to approach this remote and elusive historical period, *Chapter Three (Philosophies of the History of Philosophy in the Source Region of Phenomenology)* starts by taking recourse to a special genre of occasional literature, also employed at the begin of the previous

chapter, namely general encyclopedias for the educated audience (a genre which undoubtedly flourished in the nineteenth century). In this regard, the so-called »zeroth edition« of the renowned *Meyers Konversations-Lexikon. Eine Encyklopädie des allgemeinen Wissens* (*Meyer's Conversational Lexicon. An Encyclopedia of General Knowledge*), published by the adventurous entrepreneur Joseph Meyer (1796–1856), is of exceptional usefulness for the purposes of the present book, as its volumes were published between 1840 and 1855, i.e., precisely during the darkest period of German academic philosophy (*Universitätsphilosophie*) that followed upon the demise of Hegelianism and preceded even the precursors of phenomenology (not to mention the forerunners and early figures of phenomenology). It is not only that the chapter's analysis of the anonymous entry "philosophy" sets the stage for the further historical investigations, but the variants of this entry in the subsequent editions of the encyclopedia, published by the professional entrepreneur and social reformer Hermann Julius Meyer (1826–1909; son of Joseph Meyer), could provide another guiding line for the historical chapters of the present book, which, as we will see in due course, would eventually fuse with the guiding line obtained from Alexander.

The chronological point of departure of this historical investigation is the sudden death of Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (b. 1770) on November 14, 1831. By that time, Hegel was not only regarded as a philosophical demigod by his Prussian contemporaries, but he also had been in talks with a publisher just before his death; thus, it is far from being surprising that, within days of the catastrophe, the inner circle of the faithful, unpretentiously named *Verein von Freunden des Verewigten* (*Association of the Friends of the Immortalized*), devised the plan of publishing the collected works of the master. What is perhaps more surprising is that this edition, one of the crown jewels of which was planned to be Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (precisely an iteration of which Hegel, despite his generally ailing health, but without any premonition of its looming collapse, started to deliver in the winter semester of 1831), was promised to be based on rigorous philological principles ("the best material from Hegel's own lecturing notebooks, compared and collated with the best notebooks by his students," Hegel's young widow, Marie Hegel née Tuchner von Simmelsdorf [1791–1855] confided in a private letter). Yet, the promise of rigorous philological principles remained unfulfilled by the edition

realized between 1832 and 1845. Karl Ludwig Michelet (1801–1893), who edited Hegel's lecture course on the history of philosophy within the series, created a synthetic text, without any philological apparatus, which could justly be regarded as an antithesis of the original philological hopes. As if that were not enough, due to the inexplicable calamities of Hegel's edition history, a historical-critical edition of Hegel's lecture courses on the history of philosophy is still missing (the first of the six sub-volumes was published in 2016, the second is still in preparation as of today). It almost goes without saying that valuable primary sources, which were still admittedly available to Michelet, had been already lost by the time of Johannes Hoffmeister incomplete attempt at a critical edition, first published in 1940. At the same time, as it has been argued in the research literature, readings of Hegel philosophy of the history determined by these philological-historical insufficiencies constitute an inextricable part of Hegel's interpretation history, without which this interpretation history, including the scholarly requirement of producing historical-critical editions, would not have been possible in the first place. Furthermore, one might ask whether this manifest and non-trivial hermeneutical situation, i.e., the circular embeddedness of interpretation history within the edition history, could constitute a paradigmatic example of material aspects of the history of philosophy, respectively the philosophical significance of these aspects which none other than Hegel himself intended to downplay.

In order to convert the big notes of such speculative observations into the small change of historiographical work (in a true phenomenological fashion), the present chapter investigates variants of Hegel's characteristic claims about the philosophy of the history of philosophy (especially the claim of a supposed parallelism between the historical and the logical dynamics of development), to the extent which they can be identified in the subsequent iterations of the introductory part of his lecture course on the history of philosophy, and respectively in other parts of Hegel's oeuvre. Even though there are textual, conceptual, and scholarly reasons for more charitable interpretations, they cannot be unambiguously correlated with Hegel's own development; thus, the prevalent negative view of the merits of Hegel's philosophy of the history of philosophy was not merely due to the unfortunate historical fact that Michelet preferred the most rigid form of the parallelism thesis that was rooted in Hegel's lecturing activity in Jena.

The other circumstance which precluded a more productive – and maybe more authentic – interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of the history of philosophy was the rapid schematization of this theory in the hands of Hegel’s orthodox disciples. The present chapter first investigates Johann Eduard Erdmann (1805–1892), an influential figure of the mid-nineteenth century German academic philosophy, who probably even taught the young Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) as well. Erdmann is usually, though slightly imprecisely credited with coining the term »psychologism«, and the trajectory of Erdmann’s Hegelian psychology, manifested in various editions of his psychology textbook (which, by the way, was published in a contemporaneous Hungarian translation as well), indeed epitomizes the fate of Hegelian claims of philosophy’s precedence over positive sciences. In particular, as Erdmann’s debate with Franz Exner (1802–1853) – a former student of the Prague polymath and anti-Kantian philosopher Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) – demonstrates, one must acknowledge the possibility of philosophically relevant discrepancy between »dialectical« and »factual« orders of development. The early form of Erdmann’s specific theory of the history of philosophy could still be regarded as a *bona fide* attempt at a reconciliation between Hegel’s original theory and the admittedly growing number of its enemies. Yet, Erdmann arguably failed to provide a plausible Hegelian answer to the question pertaining to the undeniable surplus (the *Sprung*) between the logical construction of the history of philosophy and, respectively, the empirical material of history (i.e., a particular »philosopher in flesh and blood«, to whom the logical construction must be assigned). In the end, Erdmann’s main contribution to the reception history of Hegel’s philosophy of the history of philosophy consists in its lethal metamorphosis (reconstructed through the optics of Erdmann’s debate with an obscure contemporaneous Catholic philosopher, Thaddäus Anselm Rixner [1766–1838]), insofar as Erdmann not only provided an extremely formalized – i.e., formalisation in contrast to the logical operation of generalization – conception of writing the history of philosophy, but he also transformed the historian’s own philosophical position – the *condition sine qua non* of any genuinely Hegelian conception of writing the history of philosophy – into an empty formalistic one, devoid of any actual philosophical content.

The third protagonist of the present chapter is Eduard Zeller (1814–1908), whose intellectual biography arched from the humble begin-



nings as an iconoclast and marginalized Bible scholar to a decorated professor appointed to the most renowned professorial chair in philosophy at the University of Berlin, the heart of the nascent German Empire. The leitmotif of Zeller's intellectual biography was precisely the manifestations of theoretical claims for truths embedded within the medium of historical texts. The research program of the »Hellenization of Christianity«, which Zeller inherited from the so-called Tübingen School of Theology (Zeller also became son-in-law of Ferdinand Christian Baur [1792–1860], the *de facto* head of the Tübingen School), motivated Zeller to mitigate between a broadly-speaking Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy (e.g., an insight into the »inner organism of the development« of philosophy) and a positivist attention towards the historical minutiae in his juvenilia on the history of ancient philosophy. At the same time, as his early dedicated essay on the methodology of Biblical criticism demonstrates, Zeller was unequivocally committed to an exegetical framework that *a priori* excludes any supranatural pretension (including the methodological claim of divine inspiration), thereby dissociating himself Hegelian history-writing of philosophy (in any genuine sense of the term). After all, the *differentia specifica* of the latter consists in precisely the innovative idea, which captured the fascination of Hegel's students and which was still retained even in Erdmann's most formalistic version of Hegel's theory, namely to regard superseded historical philosophies as living philosophies in their own right which must be presented and criticized in their own terms. Throughout his entire career, Zeller's exegetical views were determined by assumptions typical of the so-called »*first quest*« period of Biblical criticism which are now regarded obsolete (e.g., the devaluation of oral transmission, the unjustified asymmetry between canonical sources and apocrypha, the lack of social dimensions, not to mention the discoveries of new primary sources in the meantime); yet, the trajectory of his views on the methodology of writing the history of philosophy – which are reconstructed through Zeller's methodological debate with a minor contemporaneous Protestant philosopher, Johann Ulrich Wirth (1810–1859), as well by taking into consideration the wider contexts of the mature Zeller's glorious period at the University of Berlin – is indicative of the final surrender of Hegelian history-writing of philosophy to an admittedly scientific, but entirely aphilosophical methodological conception (apart from Zeller's proto-hermeneutical conception of how to read

historical texts). In the end, Zeller's struggle with implementing his nineteenth-century variant of »doing philosophy historically« is part of the German academic philosophy's post-Hegelian »identity crisis« (or, more succinctly, »obsolescence crisis«), rather than something that could provide us with a ready-made solution to reconciling philosophy and its history.

One might object that Continental Philosophy, more specifically phenomenology, is actually in the possession of a sophisticated philosophical theory of the history of philosophy, namely the theory of the so-called Four Phases of Philosophy, devised by none other than Franz Brentano (1838–1917), the »grandfather« of phenomenology and founder of the eponymous school in late nineteenth century Austrian philosophy. Thus, one might argue, the present attempt at understanding the history of philosophy from the point of view of contemporary philosophy should simply take Brentano's theory as its basis, instead of the hermeneutically enlightened approach pursued so far. While Brentano's theory is indeed widely known (even though it is surprisingly less emphasized by some standard accounts of the theory-history of the history of philosophy), the tone of this reception is almost entirely negative; hence the direct application of Brentano's proposed theory seems unsuited for the present purposes. Instead, *Chapter Four (Franz Brentano's Philosophy of the History of Philosophy)* attempts to adopt an indirect approach in order to integrate Brentano's distinct theory of the history of philosophy and its lessons within the present investigation. The contemporaneous perspective on Brentano's controversial theory and his similarly complex public persona is, at first, reconstructed on the basis of occasional literature, including historical newspapers, and the obtained perspective is gradually expanded to include more professional venues, starting with general intellectual journals. Indeed, it was in the *Österreichisches Litteraturblatt* (Austrian Journal of Literature) where Kazimir Twardowski (1866–1938), a semi-heterodox young member of the School of Brentano, published his concise article that defined the standard form of Brentano's theory (not least because of the informative diagram included in Twardowski's article, which is reproduced in the present book). There was, however, more at stake here philosophically, as amply demonstrated by another piece published in a general cultural journal (*Westermanns illustrierte deutsche Monats-Hefte*; Westermann's Illustrated German Monthly) by another, though more het-

erodox young member of the Vienna wing of the School Brentano, the quixotic Hans Schmidkunz (1863–1934), whose academic career had just suffered a breakdown due to convulsions between his parapsychological interests and his private life. In a fascinating way, Schmidkunz' polite critique of his former philosophical master's theory not only anticipated the modern issues of minor authors and other material intricacies of the history of philosophy, but Schmidkunz turns out to be a forgotten pioneer of what is nowadays called conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*) in German philosophy. He even devised an intriguing phenomenological methodology for it, which he presented at various occasions (not to mention his lengthy terminological appendix to a translation of David Hume by one of his unidentifiable students), as well as an ambitious plan to establish a journal dedicated to conceptual history (*Internationales Archiv für wissenschaftliche Terminologie*; International Archives of Scientific Terminology), which had been sadly precluded by his looming career collapse. It is indicative of the pioneering character of Schmidkunz' proposal that the German philosophical audience had to wait more than a half century for the establishment of such a dedicated journal (*Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*; Archives for Conceptual History). Furthermore, the contextualized presentation of Brentano's distinct theory of the history of philosophy, including the voices of his more professional critics, manifests the ambiguities lurking not only in this specific theory of Brentano, but also in Brentano's broader metaphilosophical program, that was closer to a premodern, first-order metaphysical project (also indebted to the tradition of early Neo-Scholastic metaphysics), as it would be suggested by Brentano's allegiance pledged to modern scientific »empirical psychology«. These factors might explain the negative reception history of Brentano's theory, which the present chapter intended to overcome by virtue of a contextualized way of presentation.

The parts of the present book dedicated to historical investigations are concluded by *Chapter Five (Historical Epilogues: The Young Husserl and the Elderly Dilthey)*, in which many of the protagonists of our story encounter each other in unexpected settings. The chapter begins with exploring the conceptions of the history of philosophy which the young Husserl could have come into contact with before the beginning of his university studies. Robert Zimmermann (1824–1898) is revealed as the hidden protagonists of our story, integrating several threads of our historical investigation, as he was not only an influential

teacher of the young Alexander in Vienna, but also that of Edmund Husserl (despite Zimmermann's almost total omission from the canonized history of phenomenology), and, last but not least, the author of several variants of the lexicon entry that served as a guiding thread of our historical investigation so far. The present chapter also relies on a hitherto unknown manuscript to reconstruct Husserl's specific theory of the history of philosophy during his middle period; even though the results of these investigations are again best considered as underlying material for a sophisticated »against the grain« reading of the theory-history of the history of philosophy within the (pre-)history of early phenomenology and Continental Philosophy (which is attempted in the present book), rather than as ready-made solutions provided by this tradition. The second part of the present chapter is dedicated to another strange encounter, namely the encounter at the University of Berlin between Eduard Zeller and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), who already appeared in the opening anecdote of the present book. The reconstruction of Dilthey's own attempt at finding a middle ground between requirements of professional history-writing in philosophy (to which Dilthey was unequivocally committed), the recognition that the open course of history cannot be forced into the Procrustes bed of any overarching order (let alone a pre-given telology), as well as Dilthey's unaltering conviction in the possibility of delineating a quasi-transcendental minimal core of history's empirical variability forcefully demonstrates that the theory-history reconstructed so far by the present book cannot be continued in a direct and linear way (even if it is indeed constitutive with regard to the situation for the present questioning).

The transition towards a more directly theoretical way of questioning is undertaken in *Chapter Six (Towards a Phenomenological Philosophy of the History of Philosophy)* by virtue of a formation in semi-contemporary, i.e., post-WWII history of German philosophy, namely the so-called Münster School that centered around Joachim Ritter (1903–1974) and which gradually emerges today as the most distinctive formation in the history of post-war German philosophy. Certain facets of this school, most notably its monumental *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (Historical Dictionary of Philosophy), published in twelve volumes between 1971 and 2004 (plus a supplementary volume in 2007), could be regarded as illuminating counterparts to the historical analyses of the present book – in more than one way. The

present chapter reconstructs the genesis of the lexicon project, including its contingent relationships to Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) and Erich Rothacker (1888–1965), both of whom would have appeared as more natural choices for the position of a general editor, as well as Ritter's programmatic declarations about the lexicon project. Both the lexicon's entry on the history of philosophy, written by the »professional generalist« Lutz Geldsetzer, as well as a programmatic and influential essay written by the young ambitious member of the school, Hermann Lübbe (which is usually regarded as a central piece of the narrow contemporary scholarly literature dedicated to the philosophy of the history of philosophy) cast a strange light on the theory-history of the history of philosophy (respectively of its investigation as attempted by the present book so far), insofar as they introduce a significant and unbridgeable discrepancy between the contemporaneous perspective on the theory-history of the history of philosophy and this history *per se* in which reflections of Immanuel Kant not published until the end of the nineteenth century are assigned a key role. Thus, the history that effectuated our own position of questioning within the tradition of Continental philosophy indeed radically differs from the theory-history of the history of philosophy written on the basis of present knowledge (let alone *sub specie aeternitatis*). At the same time, Ritter's signature theory, the theory of compensation (*Kompensationstheorie*), especially in the way it was further developed in Lübbe's works originating from his early essay mentioned above, as well as Lübbe's other writings on the specificity of a genuinely historical knowledge, could lend us a helping hand in further articulating our questioning, against the backdrop of case studies chosen from the history of phenomenology. Conversely, the involvement of Joachim Ritter and his disciples explain why the present book prefers the term »Continental Philosophy«, rather than merely phenomenology.

*Chapter Seven (Meaning Formations in the History of Philosophy)* aims at a more direct phenomenological analysis of meaning formations (i.e., microstructures of intentionality) specific to the history of philosophy. It introduces a thought experiment concerning the historicity of philosophy that will accompany us through the present book and the (hopefully) definitive answer of which must be postponed until the penultimate section. It is formulated on the basis of allusions found in Husserl's late reflections on the veracity of the history of philosophy, which are incidentally not unrelated to contemporaneous



developments in Biblical criticism (specifically to the ideas of Martin Kähler [1835–1912]), illustrating the subtle, but recurring intertwinements between these two seemingly distant subject areas. The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to phenomenological investigations of the interplay of authenticity and inauthenticity, including their relationships to temporality and linguistic form, within meaning formations of the history of philosophy. These analyses rely on Early Phenomenology both as a conceptual framework and as a source of concrete paradigmatic historical examples. While many of these intentional mechanisms are not exclusive to philosophy, the history of philosophy is especially reliant on them due to philosophy's metaphysical characteristics, especially its pretension to radical intellectual autonomy.

Based on the insights gained so far, the last chapter of the book (*Chapter Eight: Macro-Level Features of the History of Philosophy*) aims at capturing the macro-level characteristic of the form of historicity specific to the history of philosophy (in contrast to other forms of historicity specific to history in general, respectively of other intellectual traditions, e.g., sciences and religion). Its point of departure is a spin-off debate from the methodological controversies in (semi-)contemporary Hungarian philosophy studied in *Chapter One*, which revolved around the extent to which the alleged hermeneutical dialogues characteristic of the history of philosophy actually amount to misunderstanding and misconstruing their respective opponents. In order to find appropriate conceptual resources for addressing this challenge, the present chapter again seeks to have recourse to the semi-contemporary philosophical school centered around Joachim Ritter (which could be regarded as an alternative of the classical philosophical hermeneutics represented by Hans-Georg Gadamer), in particular to Robert Spaemann. It is argued that, while any contentual characterization that pretends to encompass philosophy in its densely branched entirety is most probably illusory, the chances of the historical coherence of philosophy – which, of course, is far from exhibiting a simple tree structure – are usually underestimated. In particular, the present chapter relies on Spaemann's Hegelian analysis of the »controversial unity of philosophy«, which, however, is strikingly consonant with the mature Husserl's phenomenological idea of the primal foundation (*Ursiftung*) of philosophy (apart from some of the rigid commitments of the latter), in order to provide a philosophical analysis correspond-

ing to these metaphilosophical intuitions and also involving an ethical imperative that underlies Spaemann's position. On the basis of these, the present chapter radicalizes the thought experiment introduced earlier, in order for its resolution to provide positive metaphilosophical characteristics of the history of philosophy – i.e., why philosophy is essentially in need of history – and, by the same token, of philosophy itself. The chapter is concluded by more practical implications of this metaphilosophical standpoint: Far from being a mere metaphilosophical curiosity, the philosophical question pertaining to the history of philosophy reveals itself as a first-order, genuine subject matter of philosophy. In fact, it could be regarded as one of its core inalienable elements (in contrast to other traditional subject matters of philosophy, most recently logic and psychology, which gradually became usucaptured by positive sciences in the course of their development). At the same time, first-order insights resulting from the study of the form of historicity specific to the history of philosophy could be hoped to illuminate important alternating forms of historicity, e.g. that of sciences and religion (the possibility of such cross-fertilization was also indicated by the recurrent intertwinements between methodological considerations about the history of and philosophy and the history of religion, more specifically Biblical criticism; as observed throughout the historical part of the investigations of the present book).

Besides the usual *Bibliography*, divided into sections corresponding to the various kind of sources utilized, the present book also contains three special appendices which the present author considers as integral parts of the book, insofar as they intend to augment the book's main investigation by other, not narrative textual methods: the *Short Lexicon of Historical Persons* provides biographical data, with a special focus on professorial appointments and cross-references to other entries (synthetized from standard and lesser-known biographical sources), in order to further contextualize the book's historical narrative and reveal potential links between its actors. One of the *Figures* prepared by the present author intends to visualize the data contained in this lexicon by plotting the various professorial appointments on the map of Central Europe (with present borders overlain on historical ones). The other figure visualizes the structural map of post-Hegelian German academic philosophy (*Universitätsphilosophie*), by virtue of mapping the semantic distances between historical figures active in the period between 1831 and 1900, based on their entries in Ru-

dolf Eisler's *Philosophen-Lexikon* (1912). It is hoped that this figure will cast further light on the tradition of post-Hegelian German academic philosophy, which, while being the main historical focal point of the present book, constitutes one of the least accessible, remote contexts of the history of modern German philosophy.